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Abstract
We introduce an ordinal model of e ciency measurement. Our primitive is a notion of e -
ciency that is comparative, but not cardinal or absolute. In this framework, we postulate axioms
that we believe an ordinal e ciency measure should satisfy. Primary among these are choice
consistency and planning consistency, which guide the measurement of e ciency in a ﬁrm with
access to multiple technologies. Other axioms include symmetry, which states that the names
of commodities do not matter, scale-invariance, which says that units of measurement of com-
modities does not matter, and strong monotonicity, which states that e ciency should decrease
if the inputs and outputs remain static when the technology becomes unambiguously more ef-
ﬁcient. These axioms characterize a unique ordinal e ciency measure which is represented by
the coe cient of resource utilization. By replacing symmetry (the weakest of our axioms) with
a very mild continuity condition, we obtain a family of path-based measures.
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11 Introduction
Since the beginning of economics as a science, economists have tried to address the fundamental
question of how to measure the e ciency of economic systems. A classical answer to this problem
was provided by Debreu (1951) who introduced a simple method to measure the underutilization of
resources called the coe cient of resource utilization.D e b r e u ’ sc o e  cient has enjoyed a very rich
history in applied economics, primarily as a result of its’ operationalization for applied economists
by Farrell (1957). See, for example, Nishimizu and Page (1982), Blomstr¨ om (1986), Aly, Grabowski,
Pasurka, and Rangan (1990), or F¨ are, Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang (1994).
Our contribution here is threefold. First, we introduce an entirely new framework for the
study of e ciency measurement, which is the ordinal framework. This framework allows us to
study e ciency measurement using an axiomatic approach without resorting to an ad-hoc cardinal
benchmark. Secondly, using two new properties of e ciency measures, we o↵er an entirely new
ordinal characterization of the coe cient of resource utilization. Finally, we also show the appro-
priate way of generalizing the coe cient of resource utilization to environments where commodities
need not be treated symmetrically, and end up characterizing this class of path-based measures,
which we describe below.
We understand e ciency measurement as the problem of measuring e ciency for a given ﬁrm.
In our conception, e ciency is a relationship between two factors: the ﬁrm’s technology—the
production possibilities available to that ﬁrm—and the choices of inputs and outputs made by
that ﬁrm. Thus we measure the e ciency of the chosen input/output combination relative to the
given technology. This contrasts with the traditional approach to e ciency measurement, in which
technology is assumed to be given and ﬁxed, and which seeks to investigate the e ciency of social
production as a whole.
2To understand our model, consider a ﬁrm in which a given bundle of resources is used to achieve
a certain level of production. Through a reorganization of production, it is possible that a di↵erent
bundle of resources could be utilized without hurting production. This is clearly the case if we
consider technologies satisfying free disposal and bundles containing more of all resources. It may
also be possible to achieve equal or higher levels of production with bundles containing more of
some resources and less of others, or even with bundles containing strictly less of all resources.
Thus, for a given technology, there is a set of resource bundles which could be utilized without
hurting production, which we term the input set. An e ciency measure compares the bundle of
resources that is actually used (the “inputs”) to the input set.
Our framework therefore discusses what is typically called input e ciency. This modeling choice
postulates an implicit independence axiom: the fact that the e ciency measure depends on the
input set and not on the technology as a whole bears some relation to independence axioms found
in social choice, most notably the independence of irrelevant alternatives axioms of Arrow (1963)
and Nash (1950).
To illustrate, we describe a natural property of e ciency measures which illustrates the idea of
measuring e ciency production relative to a technology. Suppose that we currently produce output
y with inputs x using technology P. Tomorrow, a new engineering discovery makes it possible to
produce the same output using fewer inputs, resulting in technology P0.D e s p i t et h en e wd i s c o v e r y ,
the ﬁrm continues to produce output y with inputs x. In this case, the ﬁrm’s production has become
(weakly) less e cient, even though the ﬁrm’s inputs and outputs have remained exactly the same.
It is less e cient because e ciency is measured with respect to the technology. In Figure 1(a), x
is e cient with respect to P in the sense that one can not produce the same level of output with
less of any commodity. On the other hand, x is not e cient with respect to P0. In Figure 1(b), x
3is ine cient under both technologies, but, for the same reason, is more e cient with respect to P








(b) x is ine cient with respect to P
Figure 1: P and P0 denote the input sets induced by their respective technologies.
The ultimate purpose of these measures is to determine which, amongst a class of possible
inputs, is the most e cient. For this reason, e ciency measures in our model are ordinal (or
comparative) and not cardinal (or absolute). This model allows us to compare the e ciency of
input-output pairs relative to existing technology. While ordinal measures allow us to say whether
one input-output pair is more e cient than the other, such measures do not allow us to make claims
as to “how” ine cient a given input-output pair is in an absolute sense. A cardinal measure of
e ciency can be constructed easily by applying the ordinal measure to some speciﬁc benchmark.
The coe cient of resource utilization is a cardinal e ciency measure of the underutilization of
resources by a given ﬁrm. It is deﬁned as the proportion of the given inputs required to produce
the same level of output. The coe cient is illustrated in Figure 2. The point x in the ﬁgure
represents the current inputs. The shaded area represents the input combinations which could be
utilized without hurting production. The straight line from x to the origin contains all of the input
combinations which are proportional to the original input bundle. The coe cient follows this line:
it is the ratio of the length of the line segment from the origin to y (the boundary of the shaded





Figure 2: Coe cient of Resource Utilization: fc(P,x)=
kyk
kxk
Following Luenberger (1992, 1996), Chambers, Chung, and F¨ are (1996) introduce measures
which depend on other lines. These measures are based on the insight that the coe cient of resource
utilization measures the e ciency of production via a numeraire; speciﬁcally, the numeraire is
chosen to be the observed inputs. Chambers, Chung, and F¨ are (1996) suggest that other numeraires
are possible and may be appropriate in certain environments. (See Figure 3.)
Existing axiomatic characterizations of technical e ciency measures also presuppose the ex-
istence of a numeraire by which one can measure e ciency. (See, for example, F¨ are and Lovell
(1978); Russell and Schworm (2009, 2010).) These measures face a weakness in that any choice of
a numeraire is necessarily arbitrary.







Figure 3: Chambers, Chung, and F¨ are (1996) suggest di↵erent numeraires.
axiomatic models of e ciency measures are deﬁned in cardinal terms, and consequently must refer
to some objectively measurable quantity. In all cases, the interpretation is measurement in terms
of the commodities under consideration. This approach is analogous to measuring utility in terms
of money: it makes sense to do so and is meaningful in many environments, but it severely restricts
us from understanding other approaches which may be equally natural.
To remedy this problem, we introduce the ﬁrst ordinal model of e ciency measurement. This
ordinal approach suggests several natural axioms on e ciency measures which we believe have not
been described before. We refer to these as planning and choice consistency.
To understand these axioms, consider a ﬁrm undertaking the following thought experiment.
Suppose that there are two plants, Paradise and Quarryville, which operate under two distinct
technologies, described by P and Q respectively. The ﬁrm currently has access to the plant in
Paradise and produces a certain output using inputs x. (See Figure 4(a).) It would also be possible
to produce the same output using inputs x in the Quarryville plant, but to do so would be judged less
e cient by our ordinal e ciency measure than it would be in Paradise because of the di↵erences in
technology in the two plants.(See Figure 4(b).) Suppose that the ﬁrm has committed to producing

















Figure 4: The gray areas represent the input sets corresponding to the various technologies.
To understand planning consistency, suppose now that the ﬁrm is told today that it is not clear
which of the two plants will be accessible tomorrow, but that the ﬁrm must order inputs now.
This results in a new technology, described by P \ Q, because it must choose inputs which would
be su cient to produce the level of output under both technologies. (See Figure 4(c).) Planning
consistency requires the following: given that it was relatively e cient to produce the output with
inputs x under technology P, it should not be more e cient to produce the output with inputs x
under technology P \ Q.
To understand choice consistency, suppose instead that the ﬁrm is told that it will be able to
choose to produce in either of the two plants tomorrow (but not both). This results in a new
technology, described by P [Q, because the ﬁrm may choose inputs that would be su cient under
7either of the two technologies. (See Figure 4(d).) Choice consistency requires the following: given
that it was relatively ine cient to produce the output with x under technology Q, it should not be
less e cient to produce the output with inputs x under technology P [ Q.
From these two axioms, we derive several new results. The ﬁrst is a characterization of the
coe cient of resource utilization (in ordinal terms) which singles out exactly which assumptions
are required for its use. We refer to these assumptions as scale invariance, symmetry, and strong
monotonicity.
Scale invariance has a natural interpretation: it simply states that whether we measure inputs
in pounds or kilograms makes no di↵erence to the measurement of e ciency. Symmetry, on the
other hand, states that all inputs should be treated the same with respect to the measure. That is,
symmetry requires that two technologies which are obtained by relabeling names of commodities
should be treated equivalently according to the measure. It is a strong property that elucidates
exactly the essence of the coe cient.
One other property naturally presents itself. Suppose that we have two technologies P and P0.
We can say that it is unambiguously more e cient to produce an output under P0 than under P if
for any input x which can produce the output under P, it is possible to produce the same output
under P0 using strictly fewer of all resources contained in x. If technology becomes unambiguously
more e cient yet we retain the previous level of inputs and outputs, then there should be a strict
decrease in the measured e ciency of the ﬁrm . We refer to this axiom as strong monotonicity.
The coe cient of resource utilization represents the unique ordinal e ciency measure which
satisﬁes the axioms planning consistency, choice consistency, scale invariance, symmetry, and strong
monotonicity. Interestingly, although the domain of ranking is an inﬁnite dimensional space, the
theorem does not require a continuity assumption.
8Because we view symmetry as the weakest of the axioms, we investigate the implications of
dropping this requirement. In its place, we add a basic continuity axiom (related to axioms found
in the decision theory literature, see Arrow (1971)). With this axiom, we characterize a class of
rules which can be viewed as “generalized” numeraire rules.
These rules, which we call path-based measures, work as follows. Each such measure is associated
with a ﬁxed and monotonic continuous path emanating from the origin and ending at some ﬁxed
point. For any pair of inputs and outputs, we scale the path so that the end of the path coincides
with the vector of inputs, and then ﬁnd the point of intersection of the path with the input set
associated with that level of output. The further along this path, the more e cient the bundle of







Figure 5: Path-Based Measures are determined by increasing paths
1.1 Related Literature
1.1.1 Previous axiomatic work on e ciency measurement
Previous axiomatic work on e ciency measurement generally takes a given technology as primitive.
An e ciency measure operates with respect to that prespeciﬁed technology. (See, for example, F¨ are
and Lovell (1978) and Russell (1985).) In contrast, our approach speciﬁes an e ciency measure
9which can work across technologies. The setup of our framework postulates an implicit indepen-
dence axiom (only input sets matter). This amounts to an assumption that our measure is really a
measure of input e ciency. A dual approach might study measures of output e ciency. To some
degree, we require such a framework as our interpretation of technology may be di↵erent from pre-
ceding works. Our deﬁnition conceives of technology of the speciﬁc resources available to a given
ﬁrm at a given point in time; it is the classical notion of a production possibility set. Other such
deﬁnitions seek to understand whether society is operating at an e cient level, given the current
state of the art (in a general equilibrium context, this would be the Minkowski sum of all individual
production sets, as in Debreu (1959)).
By postulating this richer domain, we are able to come up with axioms that allow us to pin
down uniquely the coe cient of resource utilization. The axioms are both simple and intuitive.
Because of the simple structure of our axioms, by dropping the least compelling (symmetry) we are
able to suggest the “right” generalization of the coe cient of resource utilization to asymmetric
environments: namely, the path-based measures.
1.1.2 Path-based measures
Aside from the aforementioned contributions of Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957), the idea of
using a path to compare alternatives relative to some set is not new, and seems to date back
at least as far as Dupuit (1844). The classical reason to studying these objects was in order to
cardinally measure changes in welfare. When comparing two consumption bundles, one can ﬁnd
the indi↵erence set on which the second bundle lies, and then take a path-based measure based on
the original consumption. The welfare change in such a measure is determined by the distance one
would need to travel on this path. The paths considered in this literature were typically straight
10lines following an axis—e↵ectively measuring utility using a numeraire.
Wold (1943a,b, 1944) illustrates a classical construction of utility functions (taught in most
current economics textbooks) based on following a path from the origin and ﬁnding the point in
which this path intersects a speciﬁc indi↵erence curve. Allais (1952, 1981) suggests path-based
rules as a method deﬁning welfare change (analogous to compensating or equivalent variation).
Luenberger (1992, 1996) also discusses generalized path-based rules as welfare measures.
Social choice and Nash bargaining theory are rife with path-based style rules. In particular,
Kalai (1977) and Thomson and Myerson (1980) axiomatize Nash bargaining solution based on
monotone paths.
Nevertheless, as far as we can tell, our characterization of path-based measures is entirely new,
and is the ﬁrst to rely on purely ordinal comparisons.
1.1.3 Mathematics and lattice homomorphisms
Formally, our two axioms, planning and choice consistency, imply that rules (for a ﬁxed vector of
inputs) are lattice homomorphisms, from a certain lattice of subsets (ordered by set inclusion) to
the lattice of real numbers (with the typical ordering). Kreps (1979) seems to be the ﬁrst to state
an axiom analogous to choice consistency, albeit in an entirely di↵erent framework. He observed
already that this axiom was necessary and su cient (in a ﬁnite world) for a binary relation over
sets to be generated by maximization of another binary relation over points. An analogue of this
result plays an implicit role in the proof of our own result.
Miller (2008), Dimitrov, Marchant, and Mishra (2011), Chambers and Miller (2011), Leclerc
and Monjardet (2011), Leclerc (2011), study variations of the planning and choice consistency
axioms in other economic environments.
112 The model and results
A set X 2 R` is comprehensive if, for all x,y 2 R`, x 2 X and y   x implies that y 2 X.12 Let ⌃
denote the set of comprehensive and closed sets P ✓ R`
+.As e tP 2 ⌃ is referred to an input set.
Let P ✓ ⌃ ⇥ R`
++ such that (P,x) 2 P only if x 2 P. An ordered pair (P,x) 2 P is referred to as
and e ciency measurement problem. In particular, we are interested in studying two domains of
e ciency measurement problems. First, let P0 ✓ ⌃ ⇥ R`
++ denote the general domain, for which
(P,x) 2 P0 if and only if x 2 P. Second, let P00 ✓ P0 denote the domain of convex problems, for
which (P,x) 2 P00 if and only if (P,x) 2 P0 and P is convex.
The two domains we consider are each historically of interest to economists. For example, convex
technologies are particularly of interest in a general equilibrium setting. The proof structure of our
characterization results depends on the domain of interest.
An ordinal e ciency measure is a binary relation ⌫ on P. We discuss several properties of
ordinal e ciency measures.
The ﬁrst axiom is standard: it merely states that the ranking should be complete and transitive.
Weak order: The binary relation ⌫ is complete and transitive.
The second axiom is new. It was described in the introduction and relates to a ﬁrm that must
commit to producing without knowing which relevant technology will be feasible tomorrow.
Planning consistency: For all P,Q and all x 2 P \Q,i f( P,x) ⌫ (Q,x), then (P \Q,x) ⇠ (P,x).
The third axiom is also new and was described in the introduction. It relates to a ﬁrm that
1Vector inequalities: x   y if xi   yi for all i, x>yif x   y and x 6= y,a n dx   y if xi >y i for all i.
2Comprehensivity refers to free disposability. Free disposability may be unduly strong in the case of possible
congestion e↵ects. A generalization of this concept is that of “ray monotonicity,” see (F¨ are, Grosskopf, and Lovell,
1987). Our measures continue to satisfy all of the postulated axioms when input sets are only required to be ray
monotonic.
12has the option of choosing one, and only one, technology from which to produce. Note that this
axiom is stated in a nonbinary fashion (that is, it refers to arbitrary ﬁnite collections Pi). This is
so because on the domain of convex problems, it is not necessarily the case that
S
i Pi is a feasible
input set.
Choice consistency: For all x and all ﬁnite collections Pi for which x 2 Pi,i f
S
i Pi 2 ⌃ and
(Pi,x) ⌫ (Pj,x) for all i,t h e n(
S
i Pi,x) ⇠ (Pj,x).
Choice consistency is equivalent to the following on the general domain of problems. The proof
is a simple induction argument.
Weak choice consistency: For all P,Q and all x 2 P \ Q,i f( P,x) ⌫ (Q,x), then (P [ Q,x) ⇠
(Q,x).
The next property, strong monotonicity, states that as technology becomes unambiguously better,
then remaining at current production levels must be considered worse. Note that a weak version
of monotonicity is already implied by either planning or choice consistency.
Strong monotonicity: If P ✓ intQ,t h e n( P,x)   (Q,x).3
For the next axioms, we need some basic deﬁnitions. For every   2 R`
++ and x 2 R`,d e ﬁ n e
  ⇤ x ⌘ ( 1x1,..., `x`). Similarly,   ⇤ P = {  ⇤ x : x 2 P}.
Scale invariance states that the measure should be invariant to units of measurement of all
commodities.
Scale invariance: For all (P,x) 2 P and all   2 R`
++,( P,x) ⇠ (  ⇤ P,  ⇤ x).
3In this paper, when we refer to interior we mean the relative interior. For (P,x),(Q,x) 2 P, we write that
P ✓ intQ if there does not exist a continuous mapping g :[ 0 ,1] ! R
`
+ for which g(0)=0 ,g(x) = 1, and for which
g([0,1]) \ (Q \ P)=?.





    P = {    x : x 2 P}.
Symmetry, our strongest requirement, states that all commodities should be treated equally
according to the measure. It forbids us from giving precedence to one commodity over another in
terms of e ciency measurement.
Symmetry: For all (P,x) 2 P and all permutations  ,( P,x) ⇠ (    P,    x).
The coe cient of resource utilization of Debreu (1951) is the function fc : P ! [0,1] given by
fc(P,x) ⌘ inf{↵ : ↵x 2 P}.
Theorem 1. There is a unique ordinal e ciency measure satisfying the axioms weak order, plan-
ning consistency, choice consistency, strong monotonicity, scale invariance, and symmetry on either
the general domain or the domain of convex problems. It is represented by the coe cient of resource
utilization; that is
(P,x) ⌫ (Q,y) if and only if fc(P,x)   fc(Q,y). (1)
Furthermore, the six axioms are independent.
2.1 Path-Based Measures
An increasing path is deﬁned as a continuous mapping g :[ 0 ,1] ! R` for which g(0) = 0, g(1) = 1
and for which x>yimplies g(x) >g (y). A scale-invariant path-based measure is one for which
there exists an increasing path g such that, for all (P,x) 2 P, f(P,x)=i n f {  : g( ) ⇤ x 2 P}.
An ordinal e ciency measure is path-based if it there exists a scale-invariant path-based measure
f such that (P,x) ⌫ (Q,y) if and only if f(P,x)   f(Q,y).
14Monotone Continuity: Let {Fi}i2N ✓ ⌃ be a decreasing sequence of sets for which
T
i2N Fi 2 ⌃.
Let E 2 ⌃ and x 2
T
i2N Fi \ E.I f( E,x) ⌫ (Fi,x) for all i 2 N,t h e n( E,x) ⌫ (
T
i2N Fi,x).
Theorem 2. On either the general domain or the domain of convex problems, a ordinal e ciency
measure satisﬁes the weak order, planning consistency, choice consistency, monotone continuity,
strong monotonicity and scale invariance axioms if and only if it is path-based. Furthermore, the
six axioms are independent.
We illustrate the set of path-based measures by means of examples which we believe to be new
to this literature. Our ﬁrst such example is the lexicographic commodity ranking. Suppose that
the commodities are prioritized in terms of “importance,” so that commodity 1 is more important









`, and gi(x)=1i f i
` <x .
The ordinal e ciency measure associated with this path compares two problems by the pro-
portion of commodity ` that could be reduced without hurting production. If, for both problems,
commodity ` could be eliminated without hurting production, the measure proceeds by comparing
the proportion of commodity ` 1 that could be reduced without hurting production, and so forth.
Each ordering of the commodities implies a di↵erent rule. If we take the expectation with
respect to all orderings (according to a uniform measure), the resulting rule is the coe cient of
resource utilization. By changing the weighting of the lexicographic orderings, we can generate a
rule which incorporates di↵erent tradeo↵s in the prioritization of di↵erent commodities.
153 Conclusion
This paper has introduced the notion of an ordinal e ciency measure. We have suggested that
the ultimate interest of e ciency measurement is to compare alternative production plans. The
comparative structure of such a problem suggests an ordinal approach, rather than a cardinal one.
By so doing, we have been able to generate a large class of rules for measuring e ciency which depart
from classical rules. The utility of these rules lies in their freedom to adjust e ciency measurement
in order to accommodate tradeo↵s between a lexicographic approach, and an approach where all
commodities are treated equally (the coe cient of resource utilization).
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
It is clear that the coe cient of resource utilization represents an ordinal e ciency measure that
satisﬁes these properties. We show that any ordinal e ciency measure that satisﬁes these properties
must be represented by the coe cient of resource utilization. This is su cient to prove uniqueness.
Let ⌫ be an ordinal e ciency measure satisfying the six axioms, and let (P,x),(Q,y) 2 P be
e ciency measurement problems. We show that statement (1) must be true.
For x 2 R`


















. Because the coe cient of resource utilization is scale-








if and only if fc(x 1⇤P,1)   fc(y 1⇤Q,1) for any pair problems (P,x)
and (Q,y). Without loss of generality, it is su cient to show that (P,1) ⌫ (Q,1) if and only if
16fc(P,1)   fc(Q,1) for any pair of problems (P,1) and (Q,1).
For any   2 [0,1], deﬁne K( ) ⌘ {x 2 R`
+ : xi     for all i}. For any input set P 2 ⌃,l e t
 (P) ⌘ inf{  : K( ) ✓ P}. It is clear that fc(P,1)= (P). Thus to prove statement (1), it is
su cient to show that (P,1) ⌫ (Q,1) if and only if  (P)    (Q) for any two problems (P,1) and
(Q,1). Note that by strong monotonicity  (P)    (Q) if and only if (K( (P)),1) ⌫ (K( (Q)),1).
We show that for any problem (P,1), (P,1) ⇠ (K( (P)),1). This is su cient to prove statement
(1), as it implies (by transitivity) that (P,1) ⌫ (Q,1) if and only if (K( (P)),1) ⌫ (K( (Q)),1).
There are two cases.
The General Domain: For any   2 [0,1], deﬁne Ki( ) ⌘ {x 2 R`
+ : xi    }.T h e n\`
i=1Ki( )=
K( ). For j>1, let  1j be the permutation such that  1j(1) = j,  1j(j) = 1, and  1j(k)=k
for k 6=1 ,j. Note that  1j   K1( )=Kj( ). By symmetry, (K1( ),1) ⇠ ( 1j   K1( ), 1j   1)
and therefore (K1( ),1) ⇠ (Kj( ),1) for all j>1. By planning consistency and an induction





for every k  ` and therefore (K1( ),1) ⇠








⇠ (K( ),1). Now, let (P,1) 2 P0. For all P 2 ⌃, because P is closed and
comprehensive it follows that K( (P)) ✓ P, and by construction of the sets Ki it follows that
P ✓
S`
i=1 Ki( (P)). Therefore, from monotonicity (implied by planning consistency) it follows
that (P,1) ⇠ (K( (P)),1).
The Domain of Convex Problems: For any   2 [0,1], deﬁne R( ) ⌘ {x :
P`
i=1 xi   ` }, and
deﬁne Ri( ) ⌘ R( ) \ Ki( ). Note that (a)  1j   R1( )=Rj( ) for all j>1, (b) \`
i=1Ri( )=
K( ), and (c) [`
i=1Ri( )=R( ). By symmetry, (R1( ),1) ⇠ ( 1j   R1( ), 1j   1) and therefore
(R1( ),1) ⇠ (Rj( ),1) for all j>1. By planning consistency and an induction argument it





for every k  ` and therefore (R1( ),1) ⇠ (K( ),1).




⇠ (R1( ),1), so that (R( ),1) ⇠
(K( ),1). Now, let (P,1) 2 P00.B ys y m m e t r y ,( P,1) ⇠ (
T
  (    P),1). For all P 2 ⌃, K( (P)) ✓
T
  (    P) ✓ R( (P)), so it follows from monotonicity (implied by planning consistency) that
(P,1) ⇠ (
T
  (    P),1) ⇠ (K( (P)),1).
That the axioms are independent is proven below.
Proof of Theorem 2
To prove this theorem we make use of the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that ⌫ satisﬁes planning consistency and monotone continuity. Then for
every (P,x) 2 P, there exists some Q ✓ R`
+ such that (P,x) ⌫ (P0,x) if and only if Q ✓ P0.
To prove Proposition 1, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose that {E } 2⇤ is an indexed family of closed subsets of Rn. Then there exists





Proof. Note that the closed subsets of Rn, endowed with the Fell topology, is a compact metrizable
space (Aliprantis and Border, 2007, 3.95). Let K denote the collection of ﬁnite subsets of ⇤.
Consider the collection E = {
T
k2K Ek}K2K. We claim that
T
 2⇤ E  is a point in the closure of E.
To see this, let U be a basic open neighborhood containing
T
 2⇤ E . In particular, there is
a Rn compact set L and Rn open sets {Vj}J
j=1 for which
T
 2⇤ E  ✓ Lc and
T
 2⇤ E  \ Vj 6= ?.
Clearly, every element E 2 E satisﬁes E\Vj 6= ? (as E ✓
T
 2⇤ E ). To see that there exists E 2 E
for which E ✓ Lc, note that L ✓
S
 2⇤ Ec
 , so that {Ec
 } 2⇤ is an open cover of L. Consequently,





k2K Ek ✓ Lc.S o
T
k2K Ek 2 U.







 1/i. By Aliprantis and Border (2007, 3.95), it follows that the




 2⇤ E . This implies that if x 62
T
 2⇤ E ,
there exists i 2 N for which x 62
T






 2⇤ E . Now for
each i, we simply enumerate the elements of Ki and concatenate the lists of elements, to construct





We now proceed to prove Proposition 1.
Proof. Let ⌫ satisfy planning consistency and monotone continuity and let (P,x) 2 P.D e ﬁ n en o w
Q =
T
{R :( P,x) ⌫ (R,x)}. Clearly if (P,x) ⌫ (P0,x), then Q ✓ P0. Now let (P0,x) 2 P for which
Q ✓ P0. By Lemma 1, there exists a sequence {Qi}i2N ✓ ⌃ for which, for all i 2 N,( i )x 2 Qi
and (ii) (P,x) ⌫ (Qi,x) satisfying
T
i2N Qi = Q. By planning consistency, we may without loss of
generality choose this sequence to be decreasing with respect to set inclusion. By monotonicity,
which is implied by planning consistency, (P,x) ⌫ (Qi,x) ⌫ (Qi[P0,x) for each i 2 N. By monotone
continuity, it follows that (P,x) ⌫ (
T1
i=1(Qi [ P0),x). Because
T1
i=1(Qi [ P0)=Q [ P0 = P0 it
follows that (P,x) ⌫ (P0,x).
It is straightforward to verify that path-based measures satisfy the six axioms. Here we prove
the converse. Let ⌫ satisfy the six axioms. We show that it must be path-based; that is, there
exists a scale-invariant path-based measure f such that for every (P,x),(Q,y) 2 P,( P,x) ⌫ (Q,y)
if and only if f(P,x)   f(Q,y).
For x 2 R`
++,l e tx 1 be the inverse of x, so that x 1⇤x ⌘ 1. By the scale invariance axiom, for




. Let P0 ⌘ x 1 ⇤P and let Q0 ⌘ y 1 ⇤Q. Then, by transitivity,
(P,x) ⌫ (Q,y) if and only if (P0,1) ⌫ (Q0,1). This is entirely analogous to the proof of Theorem 1.
For any scale-invariant path-based measure there exists an increasing path g such that, for
19all (P,x) 2 P, f(P,x)=i n f {  : g( ) ⇤ x 2 P}. It is obvious that g( ) ⇤ x 2 P if and only if
g( ) 2 x 1 ⇤ P. Therefore, for any scale-invariant path-based measure, f(P,x)   f(Q,y) if and
only if f (P0,1)   f (Q0,1). Thus, we must show that for every (P0,1),(Q0,1) 2 P,( P0,1) ⌫ (Q0,1)
if and only if f (P0,1)   f (Q0,1) for some scale-invariant path-based measure f.
Let (P,1) 2 P. By Proposition 1 there exists Q ✓ R`
+ such that (P,1) ⌫ (P0,1) if and only if
Q ✓ P0. For a set S ✓ R`,d e ﬁ n et h ecomprehensive hull of S as C(S) ⌘
S
x2S{y 2 R` : y  x},
the smallest comprehensive set generated by S.
We claim that x⇤ ⌘
V
{x : x 2 Q} 2 Q, and consequently that Q = C({x⇤}). Assume, contrari-
wise, that this is false. (See Figure 6(a).) Because Q is closed and x⇤ 62 Q there exists x0   x⇤
such that x0 62 Q. (See Figure 6(b).) Because x0   x⇤, there exists a set of ` points x1,...,x ` 2 Q
such that, for all i  `, x0
i   xi
i   x⇤. (See Figure 6(c).) Deﬁne Hi = {x 2 R`
+ : xi   x0
i}.( S e e
Figures 6(d) and 6(e).) Let i  `. Because (a) 1 2 P \ Hi,( b )P \ Hi 2 ⌃, and (c) P \ Hi 2 ⌃
is convex whenever P is convex, it follows that (P \ Hi,1) 2 P. Next, because xi 62 Hi, it follows
that Q 6✓ P \Hi, and therefore that (P,1) 6⌫ (P \Hi,1). From the weak order axiom it follows that
(P \ Hi,1)   (P,1). From the choice consistency axiom it follows that
⇣S`
i=1 P \ Hi,1
⌘
  (P,1).
Because (P,1) ⌫ (P,1), it follows that Q ✓ P. Furthermore, it is easily veriﬁed that Q ✓
S`
i=1 Hi.
(See Figure 6(f).) Consequently, Q ✓
S`
i=1 P \ Hi and therefore (P,1) ⌫
⇣S`
i=1 P \ Hi,1
⌘
.T h i s
contradicts the weak order axiom, proving the claim.
Thus for all (P,1) 2 P there exists a point L(P) 2 R`
+ such that (P,1) ⌫ (Q,1) for all
(Q,1) 2 P such that L(P) 2 Q.D e ﬁ n e G ⌘
S
(P,1)2P L(P). Note that G ✓ [0,1]`. First, for
all x,y 2 G,e i t h e rx   y or y   x.O t h e r w i s e , ( C({x}),1) 2 P and (C({y}),1) 2 P would be
unordered, violating weak order.
Next, note that for (P,1),(Q,1) 2 P,( P,1) ⌫ (Q,1) if and only if min{x 2 G : x 2 P}  
20Q
x⇤
(a) Because Q is not the comprehensive hull of
as i n g l ep o i n t ,x
⇤ ⌘
V


























(d) H1 ⌘ {x : x1   x
0






(e) H2 ⌘ {x : x2   x
0






(f) Q ✓ H1 [ H2
Figure 6: Steps in Proof of Theorem 2
21min{x 2 G : x 2 Q}.4 In particular, L(P)=m i n {x 2 G : x 2 P}. To see why, suppose by means of
contradiction that there is y 2 G\P such that y<L (P). By deﬁnition, y = L(Q) for some Q.W e
know that (Q,1) ⌫ (P,1) as L(Q) 2 P and (P,1) ⌫ (Q,1), as L(P) 2 Q (by comprehensivity of
Q). Hence (Q,1) ⇠ (P,1). But since L(P) 2 C({(L(P))}), we know that (P,1) ⌫ (C({L(P)}),1),
hence, (Q,1) ⌫ (C({L(P)}),1), implying that L(Q) 2 C({L(P)}), a contradiction.
To prove the theorem we must show that there exists a continuous mapping g :[ 0 ,1] ! R` for
which g(1) = 1, for which x>yimplies g(x) >g (y), and for which g ([0,1]) = G.
For   2 [0,1] let H( ) ⌘ {x 2 R`
+ :
P`
i=1 xi = ` }.D e ﬁ n eg( ) ⌘ G \ H( ). Note that for all
  2 [0,1], the points in H( ) are unordered with respect to ;h e n c eg( ) is at most single-valued.




Then clearly x = L(H(h(x))), so therefore G ✓ g([0,1]). Consequently, g([0,1]) = G. Furthermore,
g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1.
It remains to be shown that g is continuous. First we show that G is connected. Suppose
contrariwise that G is not connected. Then there is a   2 [0,1] for which g( )=?. Let K( ) ⌘
C(H( )), and note that ↵ >   implies that K(↵) ✓ intK( ). Because (K( ),1) 2 P for all
  2 [0,1], it follows that L(K( )) 2 intC(H( )). Consequently, K(h(L(K( )))) ✓ intK( ). By
strong monotonicity, it follows that (K(h(L(K( )))),1)   (K( ),1). By deﬁnition of L,s i n c e
L(K( )) 2 K(h(L(K( ))), we know that (K( ),1) ⌫ (K(h(L(K( )))),1), a contradiction.
To see that the path is continuous, let  k !  ⇤ be a sequence. We want to show that g( k) !
g( ⇤). Let U be a neighborhood of g( ⇤). Because U is a neighborhood of g( ⇤), there exists a
su ciently small " > 0 such that if |xi   gi( ⇤)| < " for all i,t h e nx 2 U. Now consider the
interval ( ⇤   ", ⇤ + "). By the monotonicity of g, for any   2 ( ⇤   ", ⇤ + "), we know that
4The minimum refers to a minimum with respect to .
22|gi( )   gi( ⇤)| < ". Since there are all but a ﬁnite number of  k in U,t h er e s u l ti sp r o v e d .
That the axioms are independent is proven below.
Independence of the Axioms
We present six ordinal e ciency measures. It is simple to verify that the ﬁrst ﬁve violate each
violate one of weak order, planning consistency, choice consistency, strong monotonicity and scale-
invariance while satisfying the other six axioms, and that the sixth measure violates both symmetry
and monotone continuity while satisfying the remaining ﬁve axioms. This is su cient to prove that
both sets of axioms are independent.
Weak order: Deﬁne a measure as follows. For (P,x),(Q,x) 2 P,l e t( P,x) ⌫ (Q,x) if and
only if fc(P,x)   fc(Q,x). For (P,x),(Q,y) 2 P such that x 6= y,l e t( P,x) ⇠ (Q,y) if and only
if (i) (Q,y)=(   ⇤ Q,  ⇤ y) for some   2 R`
++ or (ii) (Q,y)=(     Q,    y) for some permutation
 . This measure violates weak order but satisﬁes planning consistency, choice consistency, strong
monotonicity, scale-invariance, symmetry, and monotone continuity.












and consider the ordinal e ciency measure ⌫ for which (P,x) ⌫ (Q,y) if and only if f2(P,x)  
f2(Q,y). This measure violates planning consistency but satisﬁes weak order, choice consistency,
strong monotonicity, scale invariance, symmetry, and monotone continuity.












and consider the ordinal e ciency measure ⌫ for which (P,x) ⌫ (Q,y) if and only if f3(P,x)  
f3(Q,y). This measure violates choice consistency but satisﬁes weak order, planning consistency,
strong monotonicity, scale invariance, symmetry, and monotone continuity.
Strong monotonicity: For (P,x) 2 P,l e tf4(P,x) ⌘ 1, and consider the ordinal e ciency
23measure ⌫ for which (P,x) ⌫ (Q,y) if and only if f4(P,x)   f4(Q,y). This measure clearly violates
strong monotonicity but trivially satisﬁes weak order, planning consistency, choice consistency, scale
invariance, symmetry, and monotone continuity.
Scale invariance: For (P,x) 2 P,l e tf5(P,x) ⌘ inf{↵ : ↵1 2 P}, and consider the ordinal
e ciency measure ⌫ for which (P,x) ⌫ (Q,y) if and only if f5(P,x)   f5(Q,y). This measure
is not scale invariant but satisﬁes weak order, planning consistency, choice consistency, strong
monotonicity, symmetry, and monotone continuity.
Monotone continuity and Symmetry: Let g :[ 0 ,1] ! R` be deﬁned by gi(x)=0i f
x  i 1







`, and gi(x)=1i fi
` <x . For (P,x) 2 P,l e t
f6(P,x)=s u p {↵ : x⇤g(↵) 62 intP}. This measure violates monotone continuity and symmetry but
satisﬁes weak order, planning consistency, choice consistency, and scale invariance.5
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